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  The Japanese government has advocated a wide range of policy measures to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from transportation, e.g. improvements of gas 
mileage, development of alternative fuel vehicles, shifts to walking, bicycles and public 
transportation for passenger transportation and to trains and ships for cargos, greening 
of highways.    The details of these policies and their effectiveness are not clear, 
however.    Furthermore, virtually no analysis has been provided on the costs and 
benefits of these policy measures.    Unfortunately, the Japanese government has been 
slow to develop the data infrastructure needed for such an evaluation.    This article 
reviews the studies conducted in the U.S. and Europe, and examines what sort of 
research is necessary in Japan. 
 
 
Note:    This article is an English translation of Discussion Paper No. 2000-CJ-24, 
Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy, Faculty of Economics, 
University of Tokyo.    
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1.  Introduction 
 
The Japanese government is organized in such a way that ministries and agencies have 
extreme monopoly power over their jurisdictions.    The lack of coordination that results 
from this structure makes it difficult to understand and evaluate Japanese greenhouse 
gas policies.    In the area of transport where many ministries are involved, this problem 
is especially acute.    The following is the outline of policies put forth by relevant 
ministries and agencies. 
 
The Agency of Natural Resources and Energy says it will 
 
significantly tighten fuel-efficiency standards (employing the top-runner 
method), based on automobile energy conservation laws, to achieve around a 
20% (gasoline fueled vehicles) or a 15% (diesel vehicles) improvement in fuel 
efficiency from 1995 to 2010. 
 
The agency also points to the need of increased public burden. 
 
To achieve the above automobile performance, consumers must raise the rate of 
premium gasoline usage from the current 20% to 50%.    The cost of purchasing 
a new vehicle will inevitably rise.    For example, a hybrid passenger car is more 
expensive than a traditional gasoline car by 500,000 to 1,000,000 yen. 
 
However, no specific measures are detailed for raising the rate of premium usage and 
proliferating high-cost vehicles of improved fuel efficiency. 
 
The Ministry of Transport says it is 
 
1.  improving the fuel efficiency of automobiles; 
2.  encouraging the proliferation of low-pollution vehicles, such as 
electricity-powered cars; 
3.  promoting the use of public transport, such as busses and trains, which are 
the most energy efficient; and 
4.  encouraging the modal shift from trucks to railway and maritime transports 
for freight movements along trunk routes. 
 
However, it is not clear whether these policies are taking real effects. 
 
The Road Council of the Ministry of Construction proposes the following policies.    In 
regard to road usage, the government should 
 
1.  promote walking for movements of short-distances; 
2.  promote bicycles as an inner-city transport mode; 
3.  promote the use of public transport, such as railways, busses, and trams; and 
4.  promote the use of fuel-efficient and energy conservation vehicles. 
 
In regard to road construction and management, the government should 
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1.  create a road environment rich in greenery, and form networks of "green 
roads"; 
2.  achieve a road system which can secure a smooth flow of automobile traffic; 
3.  form road networks facilitating efficient land use with a low burden on the 
environment, and assisting regional infrastructures; and 
4.  reduce environmental burden in road development and management. 
 
As described above, Japan's efforts to reduce greenhouse gas encompass comprehensive 
areas, such as improving the fuel efficiency of automobiles, promoting vehicles 
powered by alternative energies, encouraging walking, bicycle riding, and the use of 
public transport, encouraging the modal shift to railway and maritime transport, and 
introducing greens to road systems.    However, it is unclear what the content of these 
policies are and whether they are effective.    An even greater problem is the lack of 
analysis on how effective these policies are, and whether they are optimum, given the 
magnitude of burden the public must shoulder.    Left unchecked, the government may 
implement policies which impose extremely high costs on consumers. 
 
What is most needed now is to systematically organize measures intended for 
greenhouse gas reduction, and assess their cost effectiveness from the perspective of the 
national economy as a whole.    Unfortunately, the Japanese government falls behind in 
compiling data necessary for such assessment.    The following chapters examine 
European and U.S. studies, and discuss future research direction in Japan, as a 
preparation for a fully fledged policy assessment. 
 
2.  International Comparison of CO2 Emission 
 
First, let us examine basic data on Japan's greenhouse gas emission.    Although CO2 is 
not the sole cause of global warming, it accounts for the largest portion of greenhouse 
gas, with a notable significance in the area of transport.    For this reason, we focus on 
CO2 in this report.   
 
The figures below illustrate the amount of CO2 emission by country.    The United 
States releases the largest amount of CO2, accounting for over 22% of the world's 
overall emission.    The country also records the largest per-capita emission.    Japan's 
per-capita CO2 emission is less than half the U.S. figure. 
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Figure 2: Per-Capita CO2 Emission by Country (1996) (t-C/person) 
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The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in the 1997 COP3 (3
rd Conference of the Parties to United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), defines targets for major 
industrialized nations to reduce greenhouse gas emission.    The Protocol calls on Japan 
to achieve a 6% reduction against the 1990 figure between 2008 and 2012, allowing a 
17% increase for the transport sector, but mandating a 0% increase for the residential 
and commercial sector and a 7% reduction for the industrial sector.    However, as 
shown in the next figure, the CO2 emission actually rose by 21.3% in the transport 
sector, 13.4% in the residential and commercial sector, and 0.6% in the industrial sector 
between 1990 and 1997.    To achieve the Kyoto targets, the nation must reduce the 
emission by approx. 3% in the transport sector, 11% in the public welfare sector, and 
7% in the industrial sector over the next 10 years. 
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Note: The 2010 values are target figures. 
 
The next graph makes an international comparison of per-capita CO2 emission between 
the transport and other sectors.    It shows Japan has the lowest level of CO2 emission in 
the transport sector.    However, Japan registers the largest rate of CO2 emission 
increase at 22.2% between 1990 and 1997.    (The United States records a 10.3% 
increase, U.K. 6.0%, Germany 7.8%, Canada 18.4%, and France 12.7%.) 
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Source:    Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data, United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. 
 
Note:    The figures are in the ton of carbon.    The emission for the transport sector 
represents CO2 resulting from fuel combustion.    There is a slight variance in values 
with the Figure 3 data, because the statistics are taken from different sources.      
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Automobiles are the largest source of CO2 emission in the transport sector, posting a 
large rate of increase each year.    As shown in the next tables, the rate of increase is 
especially high among passenger cars at 25% in 5 years.    Automobiles represent a 
major source of CO2 emission in other countries as well.    Energy consumption by 
automobiles is on the rise in the United States, although not as much as in Japan, 
reporting a 10% increase in 5 years when trucks and passenger vehicles are combined.   
One of the characteristics of U.S. figures is that energy consumption is down for 
passenger vehicles, while it has risen significantly for light trucks.      This is partially 
attributable to the U.S. definition of light trucks, which encompasses SUVs (Sports 
Utility Vehicles).    As a result, such vehicles are subject to lower fuel efficiency 
regulations compared to passenger vehicles. 
 
Table 1:    Transport Sector Energy Consumption by Usage (Japan)    (million kl of 
crude oil) 
 
  FY1990  FY1995  Rate of increase 
Passenger vehicles  39.1  48.8  25% 
Passenger-use aircraft  3.1  4.0  29% 
Passenger transport 
total 
48.6 58.6 21% 
Freight vehicles  27.3  30.2  11% 
Freight aircraft  0.4  0.6  50% 
Freight transport total  31.9  35.0  10% 




Table 2:    Transport Sector Energy Consumption by Usage (United States)    (trillion 
Btu) 
 












1990  8,707 4,467 3,329  16,690  2,059 4,966 21,656 
1995  8,519 5,717 3,950  18,390  2,117 5,175 23,565 
Rate of 
increase 
-2% 28% 19%  10%  3%  4%  9% 
Source:    TRANSPORTATION ENERGY DATA BOOK:    EDITION 19, Stacy C. 
Davis, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, September 1999.    Table 2.7. 
 
3.  Cost Burden on Typical Passenger Vehicle Owners   
 
Before examining measures against greenhouse gas, let us check the structure of cost 
burden on typical passenger vehicle owners.    Table 3 is based on estimation by the 
Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association.    Although the association estimates that 
a typical passenger vehicle travels 5,700 km per annum, the Road Transport Statistics 
data says personal-use passenger vehicles drive just under 10,000 km per unit per 
annum.    This is why the table includes figures based on the annual travelling distance  
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of 10,000 km.   
 
The table shows that the cost of gasoline represents a relatively small portion of the 
overall automobile maintenance costs.    When the insurance cost is included, gasoline 
accounts for only around one-fifth of the overall costs, even at the annual travelling 
distance of 10,000 km. Table 3 calculates accumulated cost burden for the average 
automobile life-span of 9 years at the discount rate of 0%.    When converted to an 
annual figure, the gasoline cost comes to approx. 80,000 yen at 10,000 km per year.   
That means, even if the fuel efficiency improves from 12km/liter to 20km/liter, the 
annual saving in gasoline costs will be only about 32,000 yen, less than the amount of 
the automobile levy, presenting a minor incentive for cutting back on gasoline 
consumption.   
 
The Road Transport Statistics shows that the overall travel distance of passenger cars 
has increased by approx. 13.7% in the five year period to 1995.    According to Table 1, 
the energy consumption of those vehicles grew by 25% in the same period, 
demonstrating no improvement in fuel efficiency.   
 
It should be noted, however, that whether or not a rise in the gasoline tax improves fuel 
efficiency depends on the costs of technological development.    The accumulated 
gasoline cost over a 9 year period is currently 724,000 yen.    Improving the fuel 
efficiency to 20km/liter will save approx. 290,000 yen.    Since the calculation assumes 
the discount rage of 0%, the actual saving will be smaller, but comes to at least 200,000 
yen.    Therefore, when comfort and other characteristics are identical, consumers 
should choose a vehicle with the fuel efficiency of 20km/liter, even if it is 200,000 yen 
more expensive.    If the carbon tax of 20 yen per liter is introduced, the accumulated 
cost of gasoline will increase to approx. 874,000 yen.    This would translate into the 
saving of about 350,000 yen at the fuel efficiency of 20km/liter.    In this case, 
consumers can pay an additional 50,000 yen toward the improvement of fuel efficiency. 
 
Table 3:    Cost Burden of Passenger Vehicles 
 
  Lifecycle Cost (10,000 yen)  Cost per liter (yen/liter) 
  5,700 km per 
annum 
10,000 km per 
annum 
 
Vehicle  price   180.0   180.0   
Automobile Tax    35.5    35.5   
Motor vehicle weight tax    17.0    17.0   
Motor vehicle acquisition tax    8.1    8.1   
Consumption  tax   9.0   9.0   
Total vehicle cost    249.6    249.6   
Gasoline price after tax    15.4    27.0    36.0 
Fuel  tax   23.0   40.4   53.8 
Consumption tax, import tax, etc.    2.9    5.1    6.8 
Total fuel cost    41.3    72.4    96.6 
 
Note:    Calculated on the premise of a 1.8 million yen vehicle at the fuel efficiency of 
12km/liter.    Additional costs include premiums for the compulsory third-party liability 
insurance, voluntary auto insurance, and on-going maintenance costs. 
 
Most of revenues from the fuel tax is allocated to road construction and maintenance.    
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If the levy is considered as a road usage fee, consumers are paying approx. 4.5 yen/km.   
As the expressway toll is 24.6 yen/km for ordinary passenger vehicles, there is a 
significant disparity in the cost of road usage between toll-free roads and expressways. 
 
4.  Greenhouse Gas Reduction Measures in the Transport Sector 
 
A significant portion of greenhouse gas, generated in the transport sector, is CO2 
emission from automobiles (passenger vehicles and trucks).    Table 4 lists government 
policies for reducing CO2 emission from automobile traffic.    The policies can be 
broken down into 3 categories; cutting travelling distance of automobiles, improving 
fuel efficiency of gasoline- and diesel-powered vehicles, and reducing the amount of 
carbon emission.    These can be further broken down by policy type, such as direct 
regulation, levies, and assistance, each of which should be thoroughly assessed for its 
effectiveness and cost.    Since there has been hardly any research of the kind conducted 
in Japan, we review major European and U.S. studies in this chapter.    The objective is 
not to simply list various studies, but to indicate what kind of studies can be conducted 
in Japan.    Note that these studies are organized in the way slightly different from 
classifications used in Table 4. 
 
Table 4:    Structure of Greenhouse Gas Reduction Policies in the Transport Sector 
 





Provision for alternative 
modes 
Transit investment 
Bicycle support strategy 
Parking policies 
Parking pricing 





Restriction on automobile 
use (e.g., No Car Day) 
Traffic management 
Easing congestion 
Improving the traffic signal 
system 
Educating drivers 
Vehicle technology improvements 
Fuel efficiency regulation 
Support for technological 
development 
Choice of high fuel-efficiency 
vehicles 
Disseminate fuel economy 
information 
Linking fuel economy to 
automobile acquisition levy 
Linking fuel economy to 
automobile ownership levy 
Alternative fuel vehicle 
Support for the 
proliferation of alternative 
fuel vehicles 




Note:    This table is modeled after Exhibit 5-2 by U.S. Department of Transportation 
(1998), with modifications in line with situations in Japan. 
 
4.1. Pricing Policies 
 
As pricing policies, we examine road pricing, fuel levy, and carbon tax.    Road pricing 
raises the cost of automobile travelling, thus decreasing the travelling distance and 
subsequently cutting CO2 emission.    The fuel levy and carbon tax would not only 
increase the travel costs, but also provide incentives for choosing cars with better fuel 
efficiency, or opting to driving methods for lower fuel consumption.    There are 
varying estimations on the effect of such policies. 
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Price Elasticity 
 
According to The U.S. Department of Transportation (1998), the travel distance 
elasticity with respect to travel cost is betweent -0.20 and -1.00.    As a whole, 
estimation in the 1980s reported high elasticity estimates, with the long-run elasticity of 
around -0.95.    The figure dropped in the 1990s to register the long-run elasticity of 
-0.38, as estimated by Haughton and Sarkar (1996). 
 
Estimation also varies on the effect of fuel levy.    In Table 5, listing estimation 
examples in the 1980s compiled by Goodwin (1992), the long-run fuel consumption 
elasticity with respect to fuel cost is over -0.7. 
 
Table 5:    Average Price Elasticity Estimation of Fuel Consumption 
  Defined as short or long run  No term definition 
  Short run  Long run   
Time series  -0.27  -0.71  -0.53 
Cross section  -0.28  -0.84  -0.18 
Source:  Goodwin  (1992) 
 
According to Dahl and Sterner (1991), the price elasticity of gasoline demands is -0.22 
to -0.31 in short run, and -0.80 to -1.01 in long run.    The income elasticity is 0.44 to 
0.52 in short run, and 1.10 to 1.31 in long run. 
 
Harvey (1994) conducted a case study of San Francisco, and concluded that increasing 
the gasoline tax by 2 dollars per gallon will reduce automobile travel distance by 8.1% 




Unlike the fuel levy or carbon tax, road pricing is not expected to encourage consumers 
to choose vehicles of high fuel efficiency.    Yet, easing traffic congestion will raise the 
average travel speed, consequently improving fuel efficiency.    A study by the Southern 
California Association of Governments shows that charging 0.15 to 0.25 dollars/mile on 
a 800 mile stretch of highway for 4 hours during morning peak hour, would increase the 
travel speed by 10 to 20%, and reduce the travel distance by 8 to 12 % (U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 1998). 
 
Daniel and Bekka (2000) conducted a simulation for road networks in the state of 
Delaware.    Even in a scenario whereby the price elasticity of travel distance is as small 





Haughton and Sarkar (1996) estimated the effects of a fuel levy.    Their study shows 
that a rise in gasoline prices will not reduce gasoline consumption per unit distance 
unless the prices go beyond the peak figure in the past.    However, the study found that 
a price hike surpassing the past peak will have a significant impact, with the short-run 
elasticity of -0.09 to -0.17 and long-run elasticity of -0.51 to -0.66.    A drastic rise in  
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fuel levy would also deliver a major effect.    Raising the gasoline levy (currently at 
0.317 dollars) by 1 dollar per gallon would cut the short-run gasoline consumption by 7 
to 10%, and by 15 to 20% over a decade. 
 
The U.S. Department of Transportation (1998) quoted the DRI estimation (1991) 
(concluding that the gasoline levy must be raised to 0.28 dollars/gallon in 2000 and 0.48 
dollars/gallon in 2010 in order to maintain CO2 emission at the current level) to point 
out that a major hike of such a magnitude in gasoline prices would deal a serious blow 
to commuters on low income. 
 
Koopman (1995) created a simulation model for the EC, comparing the financial effects 
of the fuel levy, carbon tax, automobile ownership tax, and fuel regulations.    The table 
below indicates social welfare losses resulting from a 10% reduction in CO2 emission, 
showing that the carbon tax would be most beneficial to the welfare of economy as a 
whole.    These calculations do not take into account any benefits of preventing global 
warming.    This is why economic welfare is down in all cases.    The introduction of the 
carbon tax would cause the least loss. 
 
Table 6:    Economic Effects of CO2 Emission Reduction 
 
















Fuel levy  -1.9  -4.3  2.4  -7.1  -3.6  -4.4 
Carbon tax  -1.8  -4.2  2.5  -7.1  -3.3  -4.3 
Uniform rise in 
car ownership 
levy 






-2.2 -1.3  -0.8  -11.8  -1.9 1.0 
Source:  Koopman  (1995) 
 
Denis and Koopman (1998) made a slightly different simulation, using the revised 
version of the same model.    Their report cites inferior effectiveness of road tolls and 
fuel levy compared to emission regulations and levy on emission dependent vehicles, 
when the MCPF (Marginal Cost of public Funds) is assumed as 1.0.    This conclusion 
is attributable to the discount rate of 50%, applied on the assumption that consumers are 
highly short-sighted.    It is questionable whether this premise is appropriate, when a 
study (by Goldberg in 1996) shows consumers do not act short-sightedly.    Note that, 
when the MCPF is 1.25, the fuel levy and road toll are rated superior.    As a matter of 
fact, the social costs of these options become negative in this case.    This is because 
increased tax revenues allow for cuts in other taxes, thus reducing distortions caused by 
those taxes. 
 
4.2. Providing Alternative Transport 
 
Many countries adopt a policy of promoting the use of public transportation over 
automobiles, as a way of cutting the emission of greenhouse gas.    However, the U.S. 
Department of Transportation pointed to the need of selecting locations where there are  
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a sufficient number of potential passengers, reporting in 1998 that public transports 
consume more energy per passenger per mile than automobiles on the national average.   
Since Japan has a higher concentration of population than the United States, public 
transports are relatively more favored.    Yet, when considering energy consumption 
during the construction and manufacturing, public transportation may become less 
energy efficient in locations of low demands.    Table 7 estimates the level of passenger 
concentration public transportion must achieve in order to make them comparable in 
CO2 emission to passenger vehicles.    The results indicate that constructing a light 
transit system or tram in small cities may actually increase CO2 emission. 
 
Table 7:    Passenger concentration by public transport type, at which CO2 emission per 
person per km becomes equal to that of passenger vehicles    (unit:    person / carriage) 
Metropolitan areas  Railway  Subway  Light transit 
system 
Tram Bus 
Operation 5.4  5.0  3.5  5.2  4.6 
Operation, carriage production, and 
repair 
6.0 5.8  4.0  6.0  4.6 
Operation, carriage production, repair, 
infrastructure construction, and 
maintenance 
8.8 11.7  10.6 10.9  - 
Current average passenger 
concentration (national average) 
57.4 59.4  14.3  20.8  10.7 
Non-metropolitan areas  Railway    Light transit 
system 
Tram Bus 
Operation, carriage production, and 
repair 
6.2   5.4  8.0  6.2 
Operation, carriage production, repair, 
infrastructure construction, and 
maintenance 
9.2   7.5  10.5  6.7 
Current average passenger 
concentration (national average) 
13.4   16.1  16.5  - 
 
Note:    Based on the assumption that a passenger vehicle carries on average 1.34 people 
(based on the FY1994 Road Traffic Census figure). 
Source:    Ministry of Construction estimation from the Annual Railway Statistics 
 
The U.S. Department of Transportation (1998) also cited that supporting the use of 
bicycles or parking islands would have minimal effects. 
 
4.3. Improving the Traffic Management 
 
Although hardly recognized in Japan, road traffic management, such as controlling 
traffic signals, also has an impact on fuel consumption.    The traffic signal system, 
newly introduced in Los Angeles, is estimated to reduce signal delay by 44%, 
automobile stoppage by 41%, and fuel consumption by 13% (according to the U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 1998). 
 
The United States is also discussing a policy of setting the speed limit on motorways at 
55 miles per hour to reduce fuel consumption. 
 
4.4. Fuel Efficiency Regulations and Fuel Efficiency Tested Levies on Car 
Acquisition / Ownership 
 
The United States imposes fuel efficiency regulation called CAFE (Corporate Average  
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Fuel Economy) on automobile manufacturers, and the Gas-Gazzler Tax on passenger 
vehicles with low fuel efficiency.    There are several reports evaluating these policies. 
 
Greene (1997) considers the CAFE regulation effective.    Fuel levies are regarded less 
effective, with a recent estimation putting the fuel cost elasticity of travel demands at 
around -0.1 in the short run and -0.2 in the long run. 
 
In contrast, Dowlatabadi, Lave and Russel (1996) concludes that further tightening of 
CAFE would generate too much costs for too small benefits.    Their arguments are: 
 
(1)    The higher the fuel efficiency goes, the smaller the amount of emission reduction 
resulting from efficiency improvement will be.    (When the fuel efficiency 
improves from 5km/liter to 10km/liter, fuel consumption is reduced by 1 liter per 
10km.    However ,when the fuel efficiency improves from 10km/liter to 
20km/liter, the reduction will be only 0.5 liters per 10km.) 
(2)    The United States has numerous other greenhouse gas reduction measures with 
greater cost performance than tightening CAFE. 
(3)    The cost of tightening CAFE to 46.8 mile/gallon amounts to as much as 530 
dollars per ton of CO2. 
 
Goldberg (1996) analyzed consumer behavior empirically and reached the following 
conclusion: 
 
(1)    In the short run, automobile usage (travel distance per unit) does not respond to 
changes in fuel prices. 
(2)    The decision to purchase a car is affected by the price and fuel costs of the car. 
(3)    Consumers are not short-sighted in purchasing a car. 
(4)    The gasoline tax must be set at 780% in order to bring about a reduction in fuel 
consumption to the same extent as CAFE.    (The U.S. gasoline tax is currently 10 
cents per liter.    The tax rate of 780% translates into 78 cents per liter.    The 
average price of cars in 1987 was 12,000 dollars, with the annual fuel cost of 
approx. 300 dollars on average. 
(5)    The Gas-Guzzler Tax has a minimum effect on reducing fuel consumption.    This 
is because higher tax rates are applied to expensive models with small price 
elasticity. 
 
In Japan, a model on the effects of a "green-conscious motor vehicle taxation system" 
(as proposed by the Council for Transport Policy on May 20, 1999) was used to analyze 
the effects of levies on automobile acquisition / ownership, linked to fuel efficiency.   
The results show that such levies would improve the fuel efficiency of passenger 
vehicles by 6.23% and reduce 1.91 million t-c of CO2  emission.  However,  since 
details of the model and parameters used are not made public, it is difficult to assess 
how appropriate the results are. 
 
Hayashi, Kato, and Ueno (1999) used a different model and obtained the following 
results: 
 
(1)    Levies on automobile acquisition / ownership would affect the way consumers 
decide whether to keep or scrap a car or which model they should buy.    However,  
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an automobile usage levy such as a fuel tax would have a negligible effect. 
(2)    A fuel tax hike would reduce CO2 emission caused by driving.    A progressive 
levy on the acquisition / ownership of automobiles with low fuel efficiency, would 
also reduce CO2 emission caused by driving. 
 
It is also difficult to assess the credibility of these results.    For example, their 
conclusion that levies on automobile usage would not affect a consumer decision on 
whether to keep / scrap a car or which model to buy, is based on a demand function 
using the acquisition / ownership levy and usage levy as separate explanatory variables.   
Such a formula may not necessarily correspond to consumer's rational choices. 
 
4.5. Converting to Alternative Fuel Vehicles 
Japan is among many countries advocating the use of vehicles powered by alternative 
fuels, such as electricity, natural gas, and ethanol.    However, according to the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (1998), such vehicles yield little benefits in preventing 
global warming.    According to U.S. Department of Energy estimation, shown in Table 
8, there is little difference in CO2 emission between alternative fuels and gasoline, when 
the upstream processes are included.    Also, CNG has no global warming advantage, as 
it generates, in addition to CO2, methane, a gas with significant global warming effects.   
As for electricity-powered vehicles, if they use electricity generated from coal, the 
overall amount of CO2 emission would be greater than that of gasoline-powered cars.   
Although Japan's dependency on coal is not very significant, we must carefully examine 
to what extent alternative fuel vehicles are effective in the context of global warming. 
 
Table 8: U.S. DOE estimation of CO2 emission per travel distance (gram / mile) 
Fuel Vehicle  usage  Upstream  Total 
Gasoline 272.4  74.9  347.3 
Methanol from natural gas  270.4  112.7  383.1 
Ethanol from corn  301.1  24.4  325.5 
CNG 204.7  43.5  248.2 
LPG 235.4  28.1  263.5 
Source:    Exhibit 5-8, US DOT (1998). 
 
5.  Policy Tasks in Road transport 
 
Measures against global warming form only one of many policy tasks in road transport.   
They need to be build in a way in line with other tasks.    Road transport policy tasks 
can be classified into 3 categories;    (1) providing road transport services to motor 
vehicles and pedestrians; (2) using road space for communal and disaster control 
purposes, and (3) controlling external effects of road transport, such as air and noise 
pollution.    Table 9 lists specific policy tasks in each of the 3 categories.    We must 
formulate a coherent system of policy measures which can simultaneously solve such a 
variety of tasks. 
 
One type of measure can be applied to multiple tasks.    For example, a fuel levy would 
contribute to controlling road usage as a kind of road toll, and addressing global 
warming through reducing fuel consumption. 
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Table 9:    Policy Tasks in Road transport   
Road transport services 
(motor vehicles, pedestrians, 
bicycles, and parking) 
Road space services 
(communal drainage, subways, 
landscape, and disaster control) 
Control of road transport's 
external impacts 
Usage fees 
Congestion tax, road 
damage costs 
Traffic control 




Fixed asset tax 
External diseconomies of road 
construction 
Roadside (local) environment 
Noise 
Localized air pollution 
(NOx, PM, ozone) 
Measures against global 
warming 
 
When addressing wide-ranging policy tasks, it is essential to take a systematic 
approach.    The first-best policy of charging the users “prices” that equal the social 
marginal costs is the best starting point.    Needless to say, the first-best policy is not 
always feasible.    Yet, those who do not understand what the first best policy is are not 
capable of devising the second best policy. 
 
Unfortunately, Japan has conducted almost no assessment of the social marginal costs in 
road transport.    The next chapter presents assessment examples in the United States 
and Europe. 
 
6.  External costs of automobiles 
 
The United States has spent a large amount of time and money in studying the cost 
structure of road transport.    The most recent one was released in 1997, with the 
previous one dating back to 1982.    According to the Executive Summary of the report,   
 
“The primary objective of this study is to analyze highway-related costs 
attributable to different highway users as a basis for evaluating the equity 
and efficiency of current Federal highway user charges. The principal basis 
for evaluating the equity of the Federal highway user fee structure in this 
study, as in previous Federal HCASs, is to compare the responsibility of 
different vehicle classes for highway program costs paid from the Federal 
Highway Trust Fund (HTF) to the user fees paid into the HTF by the 
different vehicle classes. The closer that user fee payments match the cost 
responsibility for a particular vehicle class, the more equitable the user fee 
structure is for that class.” 
 
The core section of this study is the distribution of road construction / maintenance 
costs among various vehicle types.    The study also estimates the social marginal costs, 
including external costs such as congestion and noise.    It says it will release costs 
related to air pollution, when the estimation work is complete.    However, the figure 
has yet to be released. 
 
The next table indicates the estimation of social marginal costs.    It shows that the costs 
related to pavement and noise are high among large trucks with heavy axle weight, 
while passenger vehicles generate only one several tenth to several hundredth of the 
costs.    The difference is not as significant for congestion costs, but large trucks 
produce costs several times that of passenger vehicles.  
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In the United States, the cost burden of passenger vehicles is currently 2.6 cents per 
mile on average.    Therefore, the burden is greater than the social marginal cost in 
regional areas, but is far smaller in urban areas.    Similar situation exists for 
single-chassis trucks, whose cost burden is 11.23 cents, and multi-chassis trucks, whose 
cost burden is 15.23 cents. 
 
Table 10:    External (Marginal) Costs of Automobiles:    1997 Federal Highway Cost 
Allocation Study 
Pavement Congestion Crash Air Pollution Noise Total
Autos/Rural Interstate 0.0 0.78 0.98 TBD 0.01 1.77
Autos/Urban Interstate 0.1 7.70 1.19 TBD 0.09 9.08
40 kip 4-axle S.U. Truck/Rural Interstate 1.0 2.45 0.47 TBD 0.09 4.01
40 kip 4-axle S.U. Truck/Urban Interstate 3.1 24.48 0.86 TBD 1.50 29.94
60 kip 4-axle S.U. Truck/Rural Interstate 5.6 3.27 0.47 TBD 0.11 9.45
60 kip 4-axle S.U. Truck/Urban Interstate 18.1 32.64 0.86 TBD 1.68 53.28
60 kip 5-axle Comb/Rural Interstate 3.3 1.88 0.88 TBD 0.17 6.23
60 kip 5-axle Comb/Urban Interstate 10.5 18.39 1.15 TBD 2.75 32.79
80 kip 5-axle Comb/Rural Interstate 12.7 2.23 0.88 TBD 0.19 16.00
80 kip 5-axle Comb/Urban Interstate 40.9 20.06 1.15 TBD 3.04 65.15
Marginal Costs (cents per mile)
Source:    Table ES-6, Federal Highway Administration (1997). 
 
 
Assuming the exchange rate of 120 yen to the U.S. dollar, the social marginal cost of 
passenger vehicles is 1.3 yen/km in rual highways and 6.8 yen/km in urban highways.   
When the fuel efficiency is 12km/liter, the optimal fuel levy, equal to the social 
marginal cost, would be 15.9 yen/liter in rural highways and 81.7 yen/liter in urban 
highways.    Japan's current gasoline levy is in between these figures at 36 yen/liter.   
Since the Japan Highway Public Corporation charges 24.6 yen/km as highway toll, as 
explained earlier, the total burden in Japan is at a much higher level than the social 
marginal cost in urban highways in the United States.    To determine whether Japan's 
fuel levy and highway toll are at the appropriate level, we must assess the social 
marginal cost of automobile transport in Japan. 
 
A group of researchers in Britain assessed the external costs of automobile-generated air 
pollution.    Their estimation, as shown in Table 11, shows that diesel oil generates large 
external costs both in regional and urban areas.    Especially, in urban areas, the cost 
reaches 2.717 pence/km (equivalent of 5.434 yen/km at the exchange rate of 200 yen to 
the British pound).    The largest portion of diesel oil's external costs is attributed to 
health hazard caused by suspended particulate matters (SPM), which has recently 
captured media attention in Japan. 
 
This estimation puts the external costs of global warming at as small as 0.1 pence/km. 
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Table 11:    External diseconomies cost of automobile air pollution (pence/km) 
Petrol Gas Diesel Petrol Gas Diesel
Carbon dioxide Global warming 0.093 0.073 0.068 0.109 0.085 0.095
Methane Global warming 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000
Nitrous oxide Global warming 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.001
Carbon monoxide Global warming 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.001
Particulates Health 0.003 0.000 0.151 0.003 0.000 1.692
Particulates Building materials 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.035
Sulphur dioxide Health 0.024 0.001 0.014 0.173 0.001 0.182
Sulphur dioxide Crops 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sulphur dioxide Timber 0.018 0.001 0.011 0.021 0.001 0.015
Sulphur dioxide Building materials 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.036 0.000 0.038
Sulphate aerosol Health 0.033 0.001 0.020 0.038 0.001 0.027
Oxides of nitrogen Health 0.013 0.007 0.029 0.076 0.054 0.113
Oxides of nitrogen Timber 0.022 0.013 0.051 0.036 0.023 0.049
Oxides of nitrogen Building materials 0.006 0.003 0.013 0.034 0.024 0.051
Nitrate areosol Health 0.101 0.057 0.228 0.163 0.103 0.219
Ozone from NOx Health 0.045 0.026 0.102 0.073 0.046 0.098
Ozone from NOx Crops 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.006
Benzene Health 0.012 0.000 0.004 0.126 0.001 0.052
Ozone from VOC Health 0.110 0.017 0.017 0.145 0.018 0.041
Ozone from VOC Crops 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.002
Non-methane VOC Global warming 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001
Sub-totals 0.500 0.211 0.723 1.060 0.375 2.717
Rural Emissions Urban emissions Impact Emission
Damage Costs (in p/km)
 
Source:    Table 6, Eyre N.J., E. Ozdemiroglu, D.W. Pearce, and P. Steele, 1997. 
Note:    In this table, "Petrol" represents gasoline, "Gas" represents natural gas, and 
"Diesel" represents diesel (light) oil. 
 
Apart from the two examples quoted above, there are other estimations of external costs 
of automobiles.    They generally estimate high external costs for air pollution.   
Gomez-Ibanes says these figures are estimated too high because of the following 
reasons: 
 
(1)    In many cases, parking costs do not represent external costs. 
(2)    The external cost portion of accident costs is over-estimated. 
(3)    The estimation uses control costs, rather than damage costs. 
(4)    The estimation includes both road construction costs and external costs of 
congestion, amounting to double counting. 
(5)    The estimation uses the average costs rather than marginal costs. 
 
Of these criticisms, (3) applies to the air pollution and global environment costs.   
Gomez-Ibanez says, in terms of damage, the external costs of air pollution should be 1 
to 2 cents per mile per person, except for in Los Angeles and other exceptions.   
Incidentally, the British estimation, shown in Table 11, represents damage costs, thus 
quoting low external costs for rural areas.  
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Government facilities and services
   Capital 0.8 0.4 2.8 2.2
   Operating &  maintenance 0.9 2.4 0.3 3.5
   Other government (police/fire/ justice) 1.8 0.3-0.9 1.2 1.4
   Subtotal 3.4 3.1-3.7 4.3 7.1
Externalities
   Congestion 0.4 15.5
   Air pollution 1.0 3.82 4.0-7.0 6.6 7.5
     (of which,  climate change)  (0.7) (0.90)  (2.2-4.6)  (1.1)
   Noise pollution 0.1 0.1-0.2 0.1 0.9
   Water pollution 0.1 1.2
   Solid waste 0.2
   Accidents 1.4 2.74 3.3 0.6 3.2
   Energy 0.7 1.5-5.0 1.9 2.6
   Parking 2.7 0.8-3.2 5.2 10.9
   Other  0.01 8.2
   Subtotal 5.9 6.8 10.2-19.2 14.4 50.2
User payments
   Fares, tolls 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Taxes 3.4 0.7 3.0 2.0
   Subtotal 1.0 3.4 0.7 3.0 2.0
Net subsidy 8.3 3.4 12.6-22.2 15.7 55.3  
Source:    Table 1.1, Gomez-Ibanez (1997) 
Note:    Estimation figures are quoted from the following: 
WRI:    MacKenzie, J.J., R.C. Dower, and D.D.T. Chen (1992) 
T&E:  Kagoson,  P.  (1993) 
NRDC:    Miller, P. and J. Moffet (1993) 
CLF:    Apogee Research Inc. (1994) 
Litman:  Litman,  T.  (1994) 
 
Small and Kazimi (1995) assessed the external costs of air pollution, mainly for 
California.    They put the cost of localized air pollution, such as NOx, SOx, and PM, at 
0.03 dollars per mile per passenger vehicle (1992, Los Angeles).    The figure for trucks 
is 16 times the passenger vehicle value. 
 
Their study also covered the external costs of global warming.    However, citing 
difficulty in assessing damage costs, they quote control costs, as determined by Manne 
and Richels (1992).    In working out the control costs, they calculated the rate of the 
carbon tax required to stabilize CO2 emission at the 1990 level by the year 2000, and 
reduce it by 20% over 10 years.    According to the calculation, the external costs 
progressively rise to 208 dollars per 1 ton of carbon.    Based on the figure, the external 
cost of automobiles was estimated at 3.1 cents per mile per unit (or 17.7 cents/liter). 
 
This survey of past studies indicates that the external costs of global warming may be 
estimated at only 2 yen per one liter of gasoline in terms of damage cost.    However, in 
terms of control cost for achieving the targets set in the COP3 agreement, the external 
costs may be as high as 20 yen per liter. 
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7.  Global Warming and Road Transport Policy Structure 
 
As stated earlier, measures for controlling global warming are only one part of road 
transport policy tasks, and should be coordinated with other tasks.    As the starting 
point, we should examine the first-best policy where people are asked to pay, in some 
form or other, the social marginal costs.    As examined in the previous chapter, external 
diseconomies such as congestion, air pollution, and noise make up a significant 
proportion of the social marginal costs in road transport.    The important question is 
how such costs should be allocated to road users. 
 
In the area of road transport, quantitatively significant social marginal costs consist of 
congestion externalities, road damage, greenhouse gas, localized air pollution, and 
noise.    These costs are discussed in detail below. 
 
7.1. Congestion externalities 
 
As seen in the U.S. estimation examples, congestion externalities account for the largest 
portion of external costs quantitatively.    Congestion externalities fluctuate greatly 
according to regions, routes, and time zones.    It is usually large in urban areas and 
small in rural areas.    A notable difference is also observed between peak hours and 
off-peak hours (late night and early morning).    Ideally, fees should be increased on 
congested routes and time zones, and dropped elsewhere.    Until now, such an optimum 
system of congestion charges has been considered impractical.    However, 
technological hurdles in implementing the system are being cleared.    An "automatic 
fee collection system" is about to be introduced to Japanese highways.    When the 
system becomes widespread, it will not be difficult to set fees according to the degree of 
congestion.    When all vehicles become compatible with the system, the introduction of 
congestion fees will be a real possibility. 
 
In around 10 years time, we may see the introduction of the optimum congestion fee 
system.    However, for the time being, there is no choice but putting up with less than 
perfect charging systems.      One of the most extreme examples is the current fuel levy.   
Since fuel consumption is inevitably linked with the amount of automobile travel, the 
levy can be deemed as an imperfect form of road usage charge.    It may serve as a 
congestion tax if the charge is fluctuated according to the degree of congestion.   
However, it is currently levied at a fixed rate. 
 
Road tolls for highways are currently also fixed.    Some roads are waving tolls at night 
when traffic is sparse.    Expanding such flexibility in more precision will give road tolls 
the function of congestion charges.    It is desirable for at least toll roads to adopt 
variable charges in different areas and time zones, according to the degree of 
congestion. 
 
7.2. Road damage 
 
The amount of road damage by motor vehicles varies from model to model.   
Concerning pavement damages, there is a well-known fourth power rule, in which  
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pavement wears in proportion to the fourth power of the axle weight (weight on each 
axle).    The rule indicates it is heavy-weight trucks and busses, rather than light 
vehicles such as passenger vehicles, that damage pavement.    This theory is reflected in 
Table 10, which shows low external costs in pavement for passenger vehicles, and high 
costs in big trucks with large axle weight. 
 
Japan has numerous bridges crossing rivers and elevated roads running over built-up 
areas.    The costs of maintaining and repairing such structures are created mostly by 
large trucks.    Construction costs are also high, in order to build roads that can 
withstand large trucks. 
 
In view of these factors, large trucks should bear the costs of road damage, in 
accordance with their axle weight.    Just like congestion externalities, road damage is 
caused by the use of roads.    The burden should therefore be distributed according to 
the degree of road usage.    The optimum policy would be to introduce a truck levy, 
charged in line with axle weight and travel distance.    This is not entirely impossible, as 
there are some U.S. states already implementing such a tax system.    Yet, there remains 
a possibility that some drivers may manipulate the odometer to falsify travel distance.   
Measuring travel distance correctly is no easy task. 
 
Japan's automobile weight tax is supposed to be a form of burden sharing for road 
damage.    However, the narrow difference in tax rates between passenger vehicles and 
large trucks signifies that it is not serving as a road damage levy. 
 
7.3. Greenhouse gas 
 
As for greenhouse gas, the best solution would be levies according to the amount of 
emission.    This can be achieved by simply linking the fuel levy to the volume of 
greenhouse gas emission. 
 
What is important in greenhouse gas is that it is generated from almost all areas of 
production and consumption activities, and that costs for reducing it vary significantly.   
Forcing areas requiring high reduction costs to cut emission would prove to be 
extremely costly for the Japanese economy as a whole.    Rather than targeting specific 
areas, it is more desirable to introduce the carbon tax, uniformly levied across the entire 
economy. 
 
European countries levy fuel taxes as a source of general revenues, often collecting 
more than road project expenditures, as shown in Figure 5.    In this case, the excess 
portion can be interpreted as a pseudo carbon tax.    This does not apply to Japan and 
the United States, where road project expenditures exceed revenues from automobile 
related taxes.    However, this perspective needs further examination, with some arguing 
that a portion of road project expenditures, related to urban street planning and 
adjustments, should be covered by other taxes such as the property tax.  
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Source:    International Comparison by Data --- Transport Related Data Collection ---, 
compiled by the Highway Economic Research Division, Road Bureau, Ministry of 
Construction. 
Note:    Levies at the same rate as the consumption tax, value added tax, sales tax, and 
other fiscal services should be excluded, but it is unclear if this is the case. 
 
7.4. Localized air pollution 
 
Localized air pollution by NOx, SPM, VOC, etc. is more difficult to address than 
greenhouse gas, in that the amount of emission depends on the type of fuel, and that 
modifying cars is currently the cheapest way of reducing auto exhaust. 
 
In considering measures against localized air pollution, there are five points to consider.   
Firstly, light oil generates a large amount of NOx and SMP, yet is costly to control such 
emission with current technologies.    Secondly, even though technological innovation 
is expected in the future, we must provide appropriate incentives.    Thirdly, some 
measures should be taken on second-hand vehicles, as insufficiently maintained / 
repaired cars and old cars release a greater amount of exhaust.    Fourthly, how cars are 
driven also affect the amount of gas emission.    Controlling the amount of harmful 
emission relies largely on driver awareness.    Finally, it is technologically possible to 
monitor the actual amount of emission by laser and other means.    However, it would 
be costly to monitor all cars on the road. 
 
Considering the above points, it appears most practical to introduce a car ownership 
levy, according to the emission levels gauged at the time of automobile registration / 
renewal. 
 
Currently, light oil is subject to a lower rate of fuel levy than gasoline, subsequently 
boosting demands for diesel engine vehicles.    The rate variation between oil types 
needs to be abolished.  




The policy structure in regard to automobile noise contains even more complex 
elements than in the case of localized air pollution.    Firstly, as seen in Table 10, large 
trucks and busses are the main source of noise, implying significant differences in 
external costs among vehicle types.    Secondly, roadside land use greatly affects the 
level of damage.    Traffic noise causes major damage when a trunk route runs through 
residential areas.    However, the damage is small when such a road is laid through areas 
with commercial buildings only.    The United States and European countries ban the 
use of land along trunk routes for residential purposes, but such a measure is difficult in 
Japan, given the current land use.    Thirdly, there are many ways of reducing noise.   
Our task is to identify the optimum combination of such measures.    Measures against 
noise pollution include: 
 
(1)    Sound-proofing roadside residential homes. 
(2)    Measures on road structures, such as installing sound shield walls, securing space 
for environmental facilities, using the sound-absorbing pavement materials, laying 
roads underground, and employing the canal structure. 
(3)    Imposing noise regulations and providing assistance for the development of 
noise-control technologies for automobiles 
(4)    Measures for reducing the flow of large trucks into city areas, such as developing 
by-pass routes, introducing fees, and imposing traffic regulations. 
(5)    Introducing land use policies, such as changing roadside land use, and providing 
grants for building noise shielding structures. 
 
7.6. Linking costs for providing road services and costs for addressing 
environmental  issues:  Fiscal  Problems 
 
For road users causing external diseconomies, the first best policy is to ask them to pay 
for the social marginal costs that they are responsible for.    It is often difficult to 
enforce this first best policy, but the second best policy is often expected to amount to 
some form of user burden, such as a fuel tax.    The question is whether the fees and 
taxes collected from users should be allocated specifically to expenditures for road 
projects and environmental measures, or whether the money should be treated as 
general revenue. 
 
Congestion and Road Damage 
 
The financial burden of congestion externalities and road damage can be considered a 
price for using road services, and naturally linked to road services charges.    The 
system of road specific revenues is obviously based on this perception.    The problem 
here is that allocating all revenues from charges on congestion and road damage may 
lead to too much or too little road services.    This problem has been debated for many 
years, with the following conclusion.    (See Kanemoto (1997) and Newbery (1994) for 
details.) 
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The existence or non-existence of economy of scale determines whether revenues from 
the optimum congestion fees can cover the construction, maintenance, and repair of the 
optimum road capacity.    If there is economy of scale, such revenues are not sufficient 
to pay for necessary expenditures, causing road operators to go into the red.    On the 
other hand, if there is diseconomy of scale, revenues surpass expenditures, generating 
profits.    In other words, whether the charges paid by users can cover the optimum road 
investment depends on the economy of scale in providing road services.    We cannot 
draw a clear conclusion, because Japan has yet to conduct a study on economy of scale 
in connection with actual road services.    According to studies in other countries, there 
is no notable economy or diseconomy of scale. 
 
However, areas with a small amount of traffic may have economy of scale, because 
their fixed costs for road construction is proportionately high in relation to demands.   
In urban areas, on the other hand, the large number of intersections may generate 
diseconomy of scale.    Another issue which should be noted is that urban streets in 
commercial and residential areas serve a multitude of functions including space for 
pedestrians or disaster control purposes.    Therefore, costs for such roads should not be 
borne solely by automobile users. 
 
The relationship between economy of scale and road revenue / expenditure holds even 
in an incomplete charging system.    For example, when there is only a uniform fuel 
levy, it can be regarded as a type of incomplete congestion charge.    Even in this case, 
if there is a constant returns to scale in road services, implementing the optimum road 
construction should balance the revenues and expenditures in road projects.    This 
outcome is used as the backbone of Newbery's argument (1994) that the earmarked 




A similar analysis can be made in examining whether all revenues from taxes on 
environment externalities, such as the carbon tax, should be allocated to environmental 
measures.    The conclusion should be basically the same.    However, it is difficult to 
believe that there is constant returns to scale in environmental policy measures.    I am 
not aware of any empirical studies conducted in this issue, but it is likely that there is a 
major diseconomy of scale.    In this case, tax revenues would significantly surpass the 
optimum expenditures for environmental measures, thus making the introduction of a 
purpose specific revenue system totally out of question. 
 
8.  Problems of the Current System in Japan 
 
When putting forth a new policy, such as measures against greenhouse gas, the 
government must often rectify problems in existing policies.    This chapter cites several 
problems as examples. 
 
8.1. Burden on Road Users 
 
Japan's automobile levies are structured as shown in the next Table.    Levies on  
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acquiring and owning motor vehicles comes to as much as levies associated with 
driving.    The social costs of automobiles are mostly associated with car usage, rather 
than car ownership.    Therefore, in order to control externalities, it is rational to reduce 
the weight of levies on motor vehicles themselves.    An introduction of new taxes, such 
as carbon tax may be coupled with a reduction in motor vehicle taxes. 
 
Table 13:    Tax Burden of Automobiles 
   (100  million  yen) 
(1)  Motor  vehicle  acquisition 
tax 
4,700    
(2)  Consumption  tax  8,600     
Acquisition 
stage 
    Levies on motor vehicles  48,000 
(3)  Motor  vehicle  tax  17,400     
(4)  Light  vehicle  tax  1,100     
(5)    Motor vehicle weight tax  11,200     
Ownership stage 
      
(6)  Gasoline  tax  27,200     
(7)  Local  road  tax  2,900     
(8)    Light oil tax  13,000  Levies on fuel  47,000 
(9)  Oil  gas  tax  300     
Driving stage 
(2)  Consumption  tax  3,600     
Total       90,000 
Source:    Motor Vehicles and Taxes, 1999, jointly compiled by 15 automobile-related 
organizations. 
Note:    The figures are projected tax revenues for FY1999 (except for the consumption 
tax figures, which are estimated by the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association).   
(1) and (5) to (9) are purpose specific taxes (revenues specifically for road 
expenditures), and the rest are general revenues.    Note that three quarters of the motor 
vehicle weight tax is general revenues for the central government (80% of which is 
earmarked for road expenditures by the government), and the remaining quarter is 
purpose specific road revenues for regional governments. 
 
When compared with Europe and the United States, Japan's fuel tax is lower than that of 
European countries, but higher than that of the United States.    However, levies on car 
acquisition and ownership are higher than European counterparts.    A large portion of 
tax revenues in European countries represents the value added tax, which effectively 
correspond to Japan's consumption tax in that the VAT is imposed on all car-related 
consumption.    As a result, the motor vehicle tax portion is much smaller than in Japan. 
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Table 14:    International Comparison of Taxes on Automobile Acquisition and 
Ownership (Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association estimation) 
 
(10,000 yen)  Japan  Germany  U.K.  France  United 
States 
Motor vehicle tax  35.5  14.4  27.8  5.5  2.6 
Motor vehicle tonnage tax  17.0         
Motor vehicle acquisition tax  8.1         
Registration tax    0.4    2.4   
Subtotal 60.6  14.8    7.9   
Consumption tax  9.0         
VAT   28.8  31.5  37.1   
Sales tax          14.8 
Total (approx.)  70  44  59  45  17 
 
(Reference)    International Comparison of Fuel Levies --- Gasoline 
(10,000 yen)  Japan  Germany  U.K.  France  United 
States 
Fuel tax  23.0  31.0  47.7  41.8  6.2 
Consumption tax, import levy, 
etc. 
2.9 6.8  10.4  8.9 1.4 
Total (approx.)  26  38  58  51  8 
 
(Remarks)    Above figures are the accumulated total for the average automobile life 
span of 9 years. 
 
Assumptions:    Automobile price 1.8 million yen, average monthly travelling distance 
475 km, fuel efficiency 12km/liter, exchange rates 129 yen to the U.S. dollar, 22 yen to 
the French franc, 74 yen to the German mark, and 213 yen to the British pound. 
Source:    Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association estimation 
 
The burden on automobile users do not stop with levies on motor vehicles and fuel.   
They must also pay road tolls.    Compared to Europe and the United States, Japan has a 
higher proportion of toll roads.    We have yet to obtain statistics on road toll burden, 
but it can be estimated from the following data on road project expenditures.    As stated 
earlier, the Japan Highway Public Corporation charges 24.6 yen/km (ordinary passenger 




Table 15:    Road Project Expenditures 
FY  General roads  Toll roads  Regional roads  Total  Project costs per 
unit (1000 yen) 
1990 43,675  27,399  26,253  107,328  188.1 
1991 44,685  30,311  39,647  114,643  193.2 
1992 53,110  33,874  46,937  133,921  210.1 
1993 63,568  36,918  50,156  150,642  204.6 
1994 50,130  36,476  49,368  135,974  218.7 
1995 66,131  35,677  50,937  152,745  215.2 
1996 54,572  34,236  53,342  142,151  209.4 
1997 51,873  33,729  50,948  136,560  209.8 
 




Another problem of Japan's automobile related taxes is the disparity between  
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commercial and private-use vehicles.    Considering that commercial vehicles tend to 
travel longer distance, the disparity goes against the need to control externalities. 
 
Table 16:    Disparity in automobile acquisition / ownership levies between commercial 
and private-use vehicles. 
  Private-use passenger vehicle  Commercial-use passenger vehicle 
Motor vehicle tonnage tax 
(yen/0.5t.year) 
6,300 2800 
Motor vehicle acquisition tax  5%  3% 
 
Road Revenue System 
 
In examining the structure of road users' financial burden, we have explained how most 
of road-related tax revenues are earmarked for road construction and improvement.   
Now, let us identify problems of the current road revenue system. 
 
Firstly, as stated earlier, there is a significant disparity in charges between toll roads and 
toll-free roads.    From the congestion control point of view, there may be cases 
whereby toll for low-traffic roads had better be lowered. 
 
Secondly, most toll roads adopt uniform charges.    It is desirable to introduce charges 
according to the level of congestion. 
 
Thirdly, Japan has a major disparity among different oil types.    The fact that light 
(diesel) oil is levied lower than gasoline is effectively increasing the number of diesel 
engine vehicles.    In view of problems associated with NOx and SPM, diesel engine 
vehicles should not be given a preferential treatment.    LPG-powered vehicles enjoy 
even lower tax rate, and automobiles powered by natural gas, such as CNG and LNG, 
are totally tax free.    In comparison, the United States is making efforts to distribute tax 
burden according to social marginal costs. 
 
Table 17:    Disparity among Different Oil Types 
 Gasoline  Light  oil  LPG  CNG  LNG 
Japan (yen/liter)  53.8  32.1  9.8  -  - 
United States (cent/gallon)  18.3  24.3  18.3  4.3  18.3 
 
Fourthly, when the motor vehicle tonnage tax should be levied primarily on heavy 
vehicles such as large trucks, the government currently levies passenger vehicles at a 
high tax rate as well. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
 
The best approach to addressing global warming is to introduce the carbon tax, 
uniformly imposed on the entire economy.    The area of transport already has fuel 
levies in place, and only needs to adjust them according to the amount of greenhouse 
gas emission.    Therefore, when political consensus is reached, there should be little 
administrative difficulty.    The drawbacks of the carbon tax are cited as follows: 
 
(1)    Because of consumers' short-sightedness, fuel price hikes should only cause a  
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minor shift to vehicles with high fuel efficiency.    (Denis and Koopman, 1998) 
(2)    The rate of the carbon tax must be set reasonably high in order to make it 
effective, thus delivering a major income re-distribution effects.    In the United 
States, some argue that such a tax imposes excessive burden on low-income 
automobile commuters.    In Japan, burden is greater for people in rural areas, 
highly dependent on motor vehicles. 
 
As for the first drawback, there are some studies, including the one by Goldberg (1996), 
showing that consumers are not short-sighted.    The second drawback can be resolved 
to a certain extent by reducing levies on automobile acquisition and ownership. 
 
The carbon tax is desirable in that a blanket levy on the entire economy would lead to 
steady reduction of greenhouse gas emission from areas where reduction costs are low.   
Partial application of the carbon tax, for example only in the transport area, would 
cancel its advantages. 
 
In actual policy implementation, there are hardly any cases whereby the first best policy 
could be adopted.    Analysis of the second best policy is far more complex, and the 
estimation of price elasticity of demands would be required.    For example, we must 
look into the following: 
 
(1)    What are the effects of fuel and carbon levies on the travel distance and fuel 
efficiency of automobiles? 
(2)    Further construction and improvement of roads are expected to increase 
automobile travel distance.    By how much will it increase?    (The rate of increase 
was around 2% per annum from 1990 to 1995, and less than 1% from 1995 to 1997 
due to decrease in the amount of freight transport.) 
(3)    Some argue that road improvement eases traffic congestion, thus improving fuel 
efficiency.    To what extent can this be expected?    (According to Ota (1997), 
there is a positive correlation between road improvement and gasoline 
consumption.) 
(4)    Are the effects of automobile acquisition / ownership levies, linked to fuel 
efficiency and its regulations on auto manufacturers, greater than those of fuel and 
carbon levies? 
 
In addition, measures against global warming must be coordinated with approaches to 
other policy tasks.    Therefore, we need to resolve the disparity in levies among 
different oil types or between commercial and private-use vehicles.    We must also 
examine the issues of congestion charges and financial burden for road damage, taking 
into consideration the possible shift to an electronic fee collection system. 
 
As has been reiterated, the Japan government has conducted hardly any estimation of 
external costs or price elasticity of demands.    These must be studied urgently, in order 
to adopt rational policies. 
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